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INTRODUCTION
Oil is black gold1––where there is oil, there is money to be
made. Louisiana holds close to 10% of the nation’s oil reserves,
and its reserves of other minerals, such as natural gas, are even
more significant.2 Not surprisingly, the ownership of mineral rights
is frequently litigated in Louisiana, often involving family
members at war, fighting for the right to claim lucrative mineral
rights.3 To avoid family turmoil, a mineral rights owner may
choose to prepare a last will and testament to ensure that, upon his
death, the rights are given to the intended beneficiary. Although
deference to a testator’s intent is a fundamental principle of
Louisiana succession law,4 recent jurisprudence interpreting the
inception and classification of the surviving spouse usufruct and
how it applies to Louisiana Mineral Code article 190 has produced
uncertainty as to whether Louisiana courts will actually uphold a
testator’s final wish.5
Imagine a testator who creates a last will and testament
bequeathing everything he owns to his spouse. Included in the
testator’s estate is a piece of immovable property located in
Louisiana that is rich with oil, which could provide for his family for
years to come. Unbeknownst to the testator, Louisiana recognizes a
doctrine called forced heirship, which reserves for the testator’s
children a portion of his estate called the forced portion.6 As forced
heirs, his children have the right to demand their share of his estate
even though the testator bequeathed all of his property to his
spouse.7 The children successfully move to have the testator’s
bequest to the spouse judicially reduced in order to satisfy their
Copyright 2015, by ALEXANDER BAYNHAM.
1. Black Gold, MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/black%20gold, archived at http://perma.cc/7SL6-6YB9 (last visited
Jan. 23, 2014). See also Michael A. Ogline, Black Gold: An Oil and Gas Primer
for Estate Planners, 20 OHIO PROB. L.J. 31 (2009).
2. “Louisiana contains just under 10 percent of all known U.S. oil reserves
and is the country’s third largest producer of petroleum. Its reserves of natural gas
are even larger and it produces just over one-quarter of all U.S. supplies.”
INFOLOUISIANA, http://doa.louisiana.gov/about_economy.htm, archived at http:
//perma.cc/AT6V-ZTAU (last visited Jan. 23, 2014).
3. See Quantum Res. Mgmt. v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp., 105 So. 3d 867 (La.
Ct. App. 2012); Darby v. Rozas, 580 So. 2d 984 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
4. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1611 (2015); Succession of Mydland, 653 So. 2d
8, 11–12 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
5. See infra Part II.
6. See discussion infra Part I.A.
7. See discussion infra Part I.A.
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forced portion.8 As a result, the testator’s children are recognized
as the naked owners of the Louisiana property,9 leaving his spouse
with only a usufruct over that property10––even though the testator
wished to give all of his property to his spouse.
A few years later, oil operations begin on the Louisiana property
and generate hundreds of thousands of dollars in royalties. Both the
testator’s spouse and his children believe that they are entitled to the
proceeds, the spouse as usufructuary and the children as naked
owners of the land. A lawsuit is filed to determine who is legally
entitled to the mineral rights. Unfortunately for the spouse, the court
relies on a recent Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal decision,
which leads the court to make two erroneous determinations as to
the inception and classification of the usufruct.11
First, the court holds that the spouse’s usufruct was created
when the trial court granted a judgment of possession, which is the
stage in succession proceedings recognizing the relationship of the
parties to the decedent.12 Further, the court finds that the judgment
of possession occurred prior to the commencement of the oil
production on the property. This analysis is problematic, however,
because Louisiana law is clear that a judgment of possession does
not create rights––it merely recognizes inheritance rights already
conferred by operation of law.13 This incorrect finding as to when
8. Reduction is the right of forced heirs to reduce excessive donations to
the extent necessary to eliminate impingements on the portion that they are
guaranteed. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015).
9. “The naked owner enjoys prerogatives of ownership to the extent that
they do not interfere with the enjoyment of the usufructuary. Accordingly, during
the existence of the usufruct, the rights of the naked owner begin where the rights
of the usufructuary end.” A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES § 5:3, in
3 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 341 (5th ed. 2011). The naked owner may also
“dispose of the naked ownership, but he cannot thereby affect the usufruct.” LA.
CIV. CODE art. 603 (2015).
10. A usufruct is a “real right of limited duration on the property of
another.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 535 (2015). A usufructuary is entitled to the usus
and the fructus over the property, but the usufructuary is not entitled to the
abusus. Generally, this means that a usufructuary is only entitled to use and
enjoy the fruits of the property but has no power to alienate the thing. See
discussion infra Part I.A.
11. See infra Part II; Quantum Res. Mgmt. v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp., 105 So.
3d 867 (La. Ct. App. 2012).
12. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3062 (2012).
13. Id. (“The judgment of possession rendered in a succession proceeding
shall be prima facie evidence of the relationship to the deceased of the parties
recognized therein, as heir, legatee, surviving spouse in community, or
usufructuary, as the case may be, and of their right to the possession of the estate
of the deceased.”); Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., The Chaos and Confusion of Modern
Collation: A Critical Look into an Institution of Louisiana Successions Law, 75
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the usufruct was created may have serious implications if the
“open mine” doctrine is invoked to determine who is entitled to the
mineral rights, as that doctrine states that a usufructuary is only
entitled to the rights in mines that were “actually worked at the
time the usufruct was created.”14
Second, the court fails to recognize the scholarly debate over
the true type of usufruct that arises when a decedent leaves his
entire estate to his spouse and the forced heirs exercise their right
of reduction. As a result, the court holds that the spouse’s usufruct
does not qualify as a “surviving spouse” usufruct under Louisiana
Mineral Code article 190, an article providing special rules that
govern usufructs of mineral rights.15 Article 190 contains two
sections with different rules that determine whether the naked
owner or the usufructuary is entitled to the mineral rights: section
A for usufructs other than those of a surviving spouse and section
B for usufructs of a surviving spouse.16
Because the court finds that the spouse is not a “surviving
spouse” under article 190, the court applies the section that
subjects the spouse to the “open mine” doctrine instead of the
section that grants mineral rights to the surviving spouse—
regardless of whether the mine was open at the time the usufruct
was created.17 However, the court builds upon its prior
determination that the judgment of possession created the usufruct
instead of relying on Louisiana statutes and jurisprudence, which
show that a spouse who is living when the decedent dies is not
simply a legatee of the testator’s will but is also a “surviving
spouse.”18

TUL. L. REV. 411, 434 (2000) (“In a judgment of possession, an heir ‘acquires
nothing . . . that was not already his by operation of law.’” (citation omitted)).
14. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:190(A) (2000) (emphasis added). The open
mine doctrine is defined under Mineral Code article 191:
[I]f at the time a usufruct is created minerals are being produced from
the land or other land unitized therewith, or if there is present on the
land or other land unitized therewith, a well shown by surface
production test to be capable of producing in paying quantities, the
usufructuary is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the landowner’s
rights in minerals as to all pools penetrated by the well or wells in
question.
Id. § 31:191(A).
15. Id. § 31:190.
16. Id.
17. See discussion infra Part I.C.
18. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (1989); Morgan v. Leach, 680 So. 2d 1381,
1383 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
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As a result of the court’s conclusions that the usufruct was
created at the time the judgment of possession was rendered and
that the open mine doctrine applies to the spouse, the testator’s
spouse is not entitled to receive any of the mineral proceeds.
Because the judgment of possession was rendered before mineral
production began, there was not an open mine at the time of the
usufruct’s creation; thus, the testator’s children are entitled to the
proceeds as the naked owners of the property. The court’s flawed
analysis stems from its reliance on a Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeal decision that misinterpreted the law of usufruct in the
context of mineral rights, which leads to an outcome completely
contrary to not only Louisiana law but also the decedent’s intent.
This is exactly the troubling outcome that could occur as a
result of the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal’s faulty
reasoning in Quantum Resources v. Pirate Lake Oil.19 In Quantum,
the court held that the judgment of possession rendered in the
succession proceedings created the spouse’s usufruct.20 Further,
the court found that the decedent’s spouse was merely a legatee of
the decedent’s will. Even though he was, in fact, a surviving
spouse, the court held that he was not a surviving spouse under
Mineral Code article 190.21 Thus, the court applied Mineral Code
article 190(A)—the rule for non-surviving spouse usufructs that
relies on the open mine doctrine—and concluded that the spouse
was entitled to the mineral proceeds because drilling operations
commenced before the usufruct was created.22 A correct
application of the law would have granted the surviving spouse the
proceeds, regardless of whether there was an open mine at the time
the usufruct was created.23
Although the court in Quantum reached the correct result
despite its unsound analysis, potential mineral rights beneficiaries
in future cases may not fare as well should courts apply the
Quantum court’s flawed reasoning.24 The court’s improper analysis
highlights the importance of a usufruct’s classification when
mineral rights are involved—specifically, whether a usufruct is in
favor of a surviving spouse and not subject to the open mine
19. 105 So. 3d 867 (La. Ct. App. 2012).
20. Id. at 873–74.
21. Id. at 873.
22. Id. at 874.
23. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
24. The Quantum court ultimately concluded that the spouse was entitled to
the mineral rights. Quantum, 105 So. 3d at 874. Thus, as discussed in Part IV.A,
infra, the outcome was correct; however, as the hypothetical in the Introduction
highlights, the analysis the court used could lead to improper results in the
future.
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doctrine under Louisiana Mineral Code article 190(B),25 or
whether a usufruct is subject to the open mine doctrine under
Louisiana Mineral Code article 190(A) because it is legal or
conventional.26
The Quantum opinion also illustrates the importance of properly
classifying a usufruct that arises when forced heirs exercise their
right of reduction, an issue that the Quantum court did not address
and one that has been blurred by a complicated legislative history
and substantial policy changes in Louisiana.27 The answers to these
complex issues have serious implications for future legatees who
may be faced with circumstances similar to those presented in
Quantum.28 As one of the nation’s leading oil and gas producers, it is
important for Louisiana to assure landowners who bequeath property
rich with minerals that their intent will be honored when they die. As
a result of the court’s reasoning in Quantum, the intent of many
Louisiana testators is in jeopardy and at the mercy of the courts.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of Louisiana law
with respect to forced heirship and surviving spouse usufructs, and
it also examines the legislative policies behind the enactment of
Louisiana Mineral Code article 190 and the article’s application to
usufructs that include mineral rights. Part II discusses the facts and
holding of Quantum Resources v. Pirate Lake Oil.29 Part III
analyzes the scholarly debate over the proper classification of the
usufruct that a surviving spouse receives when forced heirs reduce
a disposition in full ownership. Part III further provides the proper
solution to this debate and discusses the solution in light of
Quantum. Part IV then highlights the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeal’s flawed reasoning in Quantum Resources v. Pirate
Lake Oil in classifying the spouse’s usufruct and its application to
Mineral Code article 190.30 This Part maintains that although the
court reached the correct result, the proper classification of the
usufruct in this case was a surviving spouse usufruct under Mineral
Code article 190(B), which states that the usufruct is not subject to

25. See discussion infra Part II (defining the different types of surviving
spouse usufructs); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:190 (2000).
26. “The usufruct created by juridical act is called conventional; the
usufruct created by operation of law is called legal.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 544
(2015).
27. See discussion infra Part III.
28. The mineral royalties in this case amounted to $581,269.35. Petition in
Concursus Proceeding at 15–20, Quantum, 105 So. 3d 867 (No. 686816)
(exhibit A).
29. See Quantum, 105 So. 3d 867.
30. See id.
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the open mine doctrine, and also cautions that, if followed, the
court’s flawed analysis will cause incorrect results in future cases.
I. LOUISIANA’S INSTITUTION OF FORCED HEIRSHIP, THE SURVIVING
SPOUSE USUFRUCT, AND MINERAL CODE ARTICLE 190
In Louisiana, a person dies either testate or intestate.31 Testate
succession “results from the will of the deceased,”32 and intestate
succession “results from provisions of law in favor of certain
persons, in default of testate successors.”33 Historically, testators
have been limited as to whom they could exclude from their will
and the amount of their estate that they could bequeath due to
Louisiana’s concept of forced heirship.34 In recent years, Louisiana
has moved toward free testation by virtually abolishing forced
heirship and by creating exceptions to the limited forced heirship
regime that still exists, such as the creation of the surviving spouse
usufruct.35 Most importantly, this policy change allows the “intent
of the testator [to] control,” which is at the core of testamentary
interpretation in Louisiana.36
A. Protecting the Heirs with Forced Heirship
A person in Louisiana has the right to use, enjoy, and dispose
of his property as he pleases with certain limits that are established
by law.37 One such limit is when certain descendants––forced
heirs––are guaranteed a portion of the estate, called the forced
portion.38 Historically, Louisiana’s doctrine of forced heirship was
meant to provide support for the children of decedents by entitling
them to a certain portion of their parents’ estate.39 Prior to 1995, all
descendants of a decedent, regardless of age, were entitled to a
portion of the decedent’s estate.40 However, in light of weakening
familial ties and increased life expectancy, the desire for free
testation increased so that a testator could do with his property as
31. LA. CIV. CODE art. 873 (2015).
32. LA. CIV. CODE art. 874 (2015).
33. LA. CIV. CODE art. 875 (2015).
34. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1494 (2015); KATHRYN LORIO, SUCCESSIONS
AND DONATIONS § 10.1, in 10 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 296 (2d ed.
2009).
35. See discussion infra Part I.B.
36. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1611 (2015).
37. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 477 (2015).
38. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1494 (2015); LORIO, supra note 34, § 10.1, at
296.
39. LORIO, supra note 34, § 10.1, at 296.
40. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1493 (1989).
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he saw fit.41 Thus in 1995, Article XII, Section 5, of the Louisiana
Constitution was amended to abolish the concept of forced
heirship, with two exceptions.42
First, descendants of the first degree who are, at the time of the
decedent’s death, 23 years old or younger are still forced heirs.43
Second, descendants who are, or may be in the future, permanently
incapable of taking care of their persons or administering their
estates because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity also
qualify as forced heirs.44 Descendants who qualify under these two
exceptions cannot be deprived of the “forced portion” of the
decedent’s estate.45 The amount of the forced portion that is
guaranteed to the forced heirs depends on the number of forced
heirs.46 The forced portion is a total of one-fourth of the estate
when there is only one forced heir and a total of one-half of the
estate when there are two or more forced heirs.47 When a testator
leaves forced heirs, but bequeaths a portion of his estate to others
amounting to more than the law allows, the disposition is
considered excessive.48
An excessive disposition is an impingement on the forced
portion of the forced heirs and although it is not null,49 forced heirs
may demand that the excessive disposition be reduced to the extent
necessary to eliminate the impingement.50 Therefore, forced heirs
have the power to demand that excessive donations be reduced so
that they may receive the portion of the estate to which they are
legally entitled.51 However, some donations are not considered
41. The Louisiana State Legislature began to favor free testation when it
increased the disposable portion—the portion of the testator’s estate that is
freely disposable at the will of the testator—available to the surviving spouse
and allowed for a lifetime usufruct over the portion that the descendants
inherited. See Kathryn Lorio, The Changing Concept of Family and Its Effect on
Louisiana Succession Law, 63 LA. L. REV. 1161, 1177–78 (2003).
42. See LORIO, supra note 34, § 10.1, at 297.
43. See LA. CONST. art. XII, § 5; LA. CIV. CODE art. 1493 (2015).
44. See LA. CONST. art. XII, § 5; LA. CIV. CODE art. 1493 (2015).
45. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1494 (2015).
46. See LORIO, supra note 34, § 10.1, at 314–18.
47. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1495 (2015).
48. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499
(1989); A.N. Yiannopoulos, Of Legal Usufruct, The Surviving Spouse, and
Article 890 of the Louisiana Civil Code: Heyday For Estate Planning, 49 LA. L.
REV. 803, 824 (1989).
49. The legitime is the portion of the decedent’s estate that is guaranteed to
each forced heir. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1494 (2015).
50. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499
(1989).
51. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015); see LORIO, supra note 34, § 10.5, at
318.
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excessive and thus give the testator more freedom to dispose of his
property without impinging on the legitime of the forced heirs.52
B. The Surviving Spouse Usufruct as a Permissible Burden
A usufruct is a real right of limited duration over the property of
another.53 It can be created by juridical act, either inter vivos or
mortis causa, or by operation of law––a usufruct that arises by
operation of law is legal, and a usufruct that is created by juridical
act is a conventional usufruct.54 A usufruct gives the usufructuary
the usus and fructus over the thing subject to the usufruct; however,
the forced heirs are entitled to the abusus over the thing.55 This
means that a forced heir does not enjoy the property during the
usufruct because the usufructuary is entitled to all of the fruits.56
Typically, a testator cannot grant a usufruct over the forced portion;
such a bequest is an impermissible burden on the forced heir’s
legitime.57 However, one major exception is the power of a testator
to leave a legacy granting a usufruct to the surviving spouse.58
The usufruct in favor of the surviving spouse was originally a
permissible burden on the forced heir’s portion because it arose
under intestacy and, therefore, by operation of law.59 This was so
that the surviving spouse could retain the family home and to
ensure that the surviving spouse had sufficient resources to take
care of herself and the surviving children.60 Beginning in 1888
with Succession of Moore, courts have held that a testator may
52. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015); LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (1989). See
LORIO, supra note 34, § 10.10, at 336 (“A couple of exceptions existed that
permitted the imposition of usufruct on the legitime.”).
53. LA. CIV. CODE art. 535 (2015).
54. LA. CIV. CODE art. 544 (2015).
55. If the things subject to the usufruct are consumables, the usufructuary
may consume, alienate, or encumber them. LA. CIV. CODE art. 538 (2015). If the
things subject to the usufruct are nonconsumables, the usufructuary has the right
to possess them and to derive the advantages that they produce, but with the
obligation of preserving their substance. LA. CIV. CODE art. 539 (2015). The
usufructuary is also entitled to the fruits of the thing subject to usufruct. LA. CIV.
CODE art. 550 (2015).
56. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 550 (2015).
57. Louisiana Civil Code article 1496 states that “[n]o charges, conditions,
or burdens may be imposed on the legitime except those expressly authorized by
law, such as a usufruct in favor of a surviving spouse.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 1496
(2015).
58. See Cynthia A. Samuel, William M. Shaw, Jr. & Katherine S. Spaht,
What Has Become of Forced Heirship?, 45 LA. L. REV. 575, 580 (1985).
59. See Succession of Moore, 4 So. 460 (La. 1888).
60. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, § 7.3, at 433. See generally Moore, 4 So.
460; Hall v. Touissant, 28 So. 304, 305 (La. 1900).
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bequeath a usufruct to his surviving spouse.61 In Moore, the
testator bequeathed to his wife a testamentary lifetime usufruct
over all of the property in his estate.62 The Louisiana Supreme
Court held that the testator had the ability to leave a legacy to a
surviving spouse that includes full ownership of the disposable
portion and a usufruct over the community property that formed
part of the forced heir’s legitime.63 The Court reasoned that such a
legacy was not an impingement on the forced heir’s legitime
because it was equivalent to a usufruct that arose under intestacy,
which attached to community property by operation of law.64 Thus,
the provision in the testator’s will that granted the usufruct was
treated as a confirmation of a legal usufruct and, as such, attached
to the testator’s community property by operation of law instead of
by the testator’s will.65
Similarly, in Winsberg v. Winsberg, the testator bequeathed all
of his property to his wife in full ownership and, subsequently, his
children moved to reduce.66 There was no mention of a usufruct in
the decedent’s will; however, citing Moore, the Court found that a
legacy of full ownership was not adverse to a usufruct created by
law in favor of the surviving spouse.67 The Court stated that, in
fact, the decedent intended to give his spouse more than the law
allowed; thus, the decedent’s surviving spouse was entitled to a
usufruct over the community property.68 Because the usufruct
arose by operation of law and not by the juridical act of making the
will, the usufruct did not impinge on the forced heir’s legitime.69
Later, in Succession of Chauvin, the Supreme Court relied on
the confirmation doctrine to determine the length of a usufruct that
was confirmed by testament.70 In Chauvin, the testator bequeathed
his entire estate to his son but made the bequest subject to a
usufruct in favor of his wife; however, the testament did not
61. Moore, 4 So. at 461–64.
62. Id. at 461.
63. Id. at 464. See also Succession of Chauvin, 257 So. 2d 422 (La. 1972),
overruled by statute, Act No. 77, 1996 La. Acts 1027.
64. Moore, 4 So. at 462.
65. See Moore, 4 So. at 463; YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, § 7.8, at 449
(According to the jurisprudence and article 1916, “a testamentary disposition
that was not adverse to the interests of the surviving spouse did not defeat the
legal usufruct under that article. Such a disposition merely confirmed the legal
usufruct.”).
66. Winsberg v. Winsberg, 96 So. 2d 44, 45–46 (La. 1957).
67. Id. at 48.
68. Id.
69. Id. See also Moore, 4 So. 460.
70. Succession of Chauvin, 257 So. 2d 422 (La. 1972).
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specify the length of the usufruct.71 The Court held that the will
“merely confirmed” the legal usufruct to the surviving spouse over
all of the community property, and, because there was no
indication in the will that the usufruct should be for life, the
usufruct terminated upon death or remarriage.72 Chauvin illustrates
that courts frequently used the doctrine of confirmation to
determine the length of a usufruct when the length was not stated
in the will.73
A few years after Chauvin, the Court reaffirmed Moore and
Winsberg in Succession of Waldron.74 In Waldron, the testator
bequeathed to his wife a usufruct for life over his entire estate,
which consisted of only community property.75 After the testator’s
death, his daughter filed suit claiming that the usufruct was an
impingement on her legitime.76 In holding that a bequest consisting
of all of the testator’s community property was not an adverse
disposition to a legal usufruct, the Court noted that it must interpret
the will in a way that furthers the testator’s intent.77 Thus, the
Court held that the spouse was entitled to a legal usufruct under
former article 916, which meant that the spouse was entitled to a
usufruct over the community property until remarriage.78 Again,
because the usufruct was created by operation of law, it did not
impinge on the forced heir’s legitime.79
In 1975, the same year Waldron was decided, the Louisiana
Legislature amended Louisiana Civil Code article 916,80 beginning
the movement toward expanding the rights of Louisiana testators.
The amendment of article 916 allowed a testator to grant, by
testament, a lifetime usufruct over the forced portion without
71. Id. at 422.
72. Id. at 426.
73. Id.
74. Succession of Waldron, 323 So. 2d 434, 438 (La. 1975).
75. Id. at 435.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 437–38.
78. Id. at 439.
79. Id. at 438. The predecessor to article 890, article 916, was the applicable
law at the time of Waldron, but the analysis was the same.
80. An “unless” clause was added after the words “second marriage,” which
stated:
Unless the usufruct has been confirmed for life or any other designated
period to the survivor by the last will and testament of the predeceased
husband or wife, and the rights of forced heirs to the legitime shall be
subject to any such usufruct, which usufruct shall not be an
impingement on the legitime.
Act No. 680, 1975 La. Acts 1477–78. See also YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, §
7.8, at 449; Yiannopoulos, supra note 48, at 805–06.
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impinging on it.81 In 1979, the Legislature again expanded the
rights of Louisiana testators by amending article 916 to allow a
testator to grant a usufruct to the surviving spouse over separate
property, which was to be treated as a legal usufruct such that it
was not an impingement on the forced portion.82 This amendment
granted a testator even more freedom to dispose of his property by
allowing him to grant a usufruct to his surviving spouse over both
community and separate property.83 Two years later, article 916
was repealed and replaced by Louisiana Civil Code article 890 in a
legislative effort to overhaul the articles governing the surviving
spouse usufruct.84
Article 890 encompassed the intestate legal surviving spouse
usufruct and the testamentary surviving spouse usufruct, and it
made clear that neither impinged on the forced portion.85 A legal
usufruct arose by operation of law in favor of the surviving spouse
when the deceased died intestate with community property in his
estate but also left descendants who qualified as forced heirs.86
Because a legal usufruct arose by operation of law, not by
testament, it did not impinge on the legitime of the forced heirs.87
The testamentary surviving spouse usufruct, on the other hand,
permitted the deceased to “by testament grant a usufruct for life or
81. The availability of a usufruct for life also allowed the surviving spouse
to take advantage of the tax benefit afforded by the marital deduction because a
usufruct only qualified for the deduction if it was granted for life. See I.R.C. §
2056 (2012).
82. Act No. 678, 1979 La. Acts 1775 (“Further, a husband or wife may, by
his or her last will and testament, grant a usufruct for life or any other designated
period to the surviving spouse over so much of the separate property as may be
inherited by issue of the marriage with the survivor, and the rights of forced
heirs to the legitime shall be subject to any such usufruct, which usufruct thus
granted shall be treated in the same fashion as a legal usufruct and not be an
impingement upon the legitime.”).
83. Id.
84. LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (1989).
85. Former article 890 provided in pertinent part:
If the deceased spouse is survived by descendants, and shall not have
disposed by testament of his share in the community property, the
surviving spouse shall have a legal usufruct over so much of that share
as may be inherited by the descendants. This usufruct terminates when
the surviving spouse contracts another marriage, unless confirmed by
testament for life or for a shorter period. The deceased may by
testament grant a usufruct for life or for a shorter period to the
surviving spouse over al or part of his separate property.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (1989). See also Diane M. Lloyd, Comment, New Hope
for the Survivor: The Changes in the Usufruct of the Surviving Spouse, 28 LOY.
L. REV. 1095, 1101 (1982).
86. LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (1989).
87. See Succession of Moore, 4 So. 460 (La. 1888).
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for a shorter period to the surviving spouse over all or part of his
separate property.”88 The Legislature, in revising article 890,
specifically stated that a testamentary surviving spouse usufruct “is
to be treated as a legal usufruct and is not an impingement upon
legitime.”89 This provision was necessary to allow a testator greater
freedom to dispose of his property because a testamentary usufruct
over separate and community property in favor of the surviving
spouse had historically been considered an impingement on the
forced portion.90
The testamentary usufruct that was “treated as a legal usufruct”
created a challenge for courts faced with the task of determining the
qualities of usufructs that arose under article 890, such as the type of
property that the usufruct could encompass or when the usufruct
terminated.91 For example, in Morgan v. Leach, the testatrix
bequeathed all of her property to her husband, which resulted in a
usufruct in favor of the surviving spouse due to the forced heir’s
reduction of the legacy.92 The Louisiana First Circuit Court of
Appeal held that the usufruct was legal because under article 890 it
was treated as a testamentary confirmation of a legal usufruct.93 The
court focused on the decedent’s testamentary intent and determined
that the testatrix intended that her husband be given as much
property as she was permitted to give him under the law.94
Ultimately, the court stated that the surviving spouse was entitled to
a lifetime usufruct over the entire forced portion but nonetheless
classified the usufruct as legal, even though the usufruct did not
terminate at remarriage as legal usufructs did.95
In 1996, the same year that Morgan was decided, the Louisiana
Legislature revised the Civil Code’s succession articles in an effort
to conform to the newly modified doctrine of forced heirship under
the constitutional amendments of 1995, which abolished forced
heirship except in cases of 23-year-old descendants and physically
or mentally incapable descendants.96 The 1996 amendment revised

88. LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (1989).
89. Id. See Morgan v. Leach, 680 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
90. See Moore, 4 So. at 461–64.
91. See Morgan, 680 So. 2d 1381; Succession of Waldron, 323 So. 2d 434
(La. 1975). Note that Waldron was decided under former Civil Code article 916,
which was the predecessor to article 890; however, the same issues were
presented.
92. Morgan, 680 So. 2d at 1382–83.
93. Id. at 1383.
94. Id. at 1384.
95. Id. at 1384–85.
96. See supra Part I.A.
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article 890 and enacted new article 1499.97 The revision created
separate articles for the traditional legal surviving spouse usufruct
that arose under intestacy and the testamentary surviving spouse
usufruct.98 Under current law, article 890 solely governs legal
usufructs that arise by operation of law.99 The intestacy legal
surviving spouse usufruct was not revised in substance; thus,
because there was no change in the law for such a usufruct, it still
does not impinge on the forced portion because it is created by
operation of law.100
New article 1499 governs testamentary surviving spouse
usufructs that were formerly governed by article 890 and states that
“[t]he decedent may grant a usufruct to the surviving spouse over
all or part of his property, including the forced portion.”101 A
usufruct under this article “is a permissible burden that does not
impinge upon the legitime, whether it affects community property
or separate property, whether it is for life or a shorter period, . . .
and whether or not the usufructuary has the power to dispose of
nonconsumables.”102 There is no need to “treat” it as a legal
usufruct because it is currently authorized by law.103 Some scholars
have argued that article 1499 legislatively overruled Succession of
Chauvin104 by stating that the usufruct shall be for life unless
expressly designated for a shorter period.105 In Chauvin, the Court
held that a usufruct ended upon remarriage when a testator failed
to specify the length of a testamentary usufruct.106 Although this
may be true, Morgan indicated that courts were starting to trend
toward allowing the usufruct to last for life due to the deference
that courts give to a testator’s intent.107 Thus, new article 1499
97. Kerry J. Miller, Comment, The New Forced Heirship Law, Its
Implementing Legislation, and Major Substantive Policy Changes of the
Louisiana State Law Institute’s Proposed Comprehensive Revision of the
Successions and Donations Laws, 71 TUL. L. REV. 223, 239–42 (1996).
98. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (2015); LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015).
99. New article 890 states that “[i]f the deceased spouse is survived by
descendants, the surviving spouse shall have a usufruct over the decedent’s
share of the community property to the extent that the decedent has not disposed
of it by testament.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (2015).
100. See id.
101. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015).
102. Id.
103. See supra note 53.
104. Succession of Chauvin, 257 So. 2d 422 (La. 1972).
105. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 cmt. d (2015). See also Kathryn Venturatos
Lorio, Forced Heirship: The Citadel Has Fallen—Or Has It?, 44 LA. B.J. 16, 18
(1996). But see YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, § 7.8, at 450.
106. Chauvin, 257 So. 2d at 426.
107. See Morgan v. Leach, 680 So. 2d 1381, 1384–85 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
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does not represent a profound shift in the law beyond what was
already established by the jurisprudence.
C. Louisiana Mineral Code Article 190: Expanded Rights for the
Surviving Spouse
Typically under the Louisiana Civil Code, a usufructuary has
the right to all fruits, which “are things that are produced by or
derived from another thing without diminution of its substance.”108
Neither mineral substances extracted from the ground nor bonuses,
delay rentals, or royalties are classified as fruits because they
diminish the value of the land and are not “born and reborn of the
soil.”109
By way of exception to this general rule, the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Gueno v. Medlenka held that if there were open
mines actually worked at the time the usufruct was created, the
minerals and proceeds from mineral production would be treated
as natural and civil fruits; thus, the usufructuary would be entitled
to the mineral proceeds.110 In contrast, the Court also held that
products derived from mines that were not open at the time the
usufruct was created “must be excluded, from the fruits and
products to which the usufructuary is entitled”; thus, the
usufructuary has no right to minerals produced from a mine that
was not opened until after the usufruct was created.111 This meant
that the naked owner’s right to open new mines and reduce
minerals to possession is unaffected by the subsequent creation of
a usufruct. 112
The exception created in Gueno was codified in 1974 when the
Louisiana Legislature enacted the Mineral Code.113 Louisiana
Mineral Code article 190 allowed a usufructuary to enjoy the
landowner’s rights in minerals according to the principles set forth
in Gueno.114 Prior to 1986, article 190 stated:
If a usufruct of land is that of a surviving spouse in
community, that of parents during marriage, or any other legal
usufruct, or if there is no provision including the use and
108. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 550–551 (2015).
109. Elder v. Ellerbe, 66 So. 337, 338 (La. 1914). See also Gueno v.
Medlenka, 117 So. 2d 817 (La. 1960).
110. Gueno, 117 So. 2d at 822.
111. Id. See also King v. Buffington, 126 So. 2d 326, 328–29 (La. 1961).
112. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:195 (2000); YIANNOPOULOS, supra note
9, § 2:18, at 147.
113. LA. CIV. CODE art. 561 (2015); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:190 (2000).
114. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:190 (2000).
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enjoyment of mineral rights in a conventional usufruct, the
usufructuary is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the
landowner’s rights in minerals as to mines or quarries
actually worked at the time the usufruct was created.115
Thus, article 190 governed all usufructs, including surviving
spouse usufructs, which were subject to Louisiana’s open mine
doctrine.116 A usufructuary was entitled to the use and enjoyment
of the minerals when there were “mines or quarries actually
worked” at the time the usufruct was created.117 This meant that all
usufructaries, regardless of the classification, were entitled to the
proceeds from mineral production only when minerals were being
produced from the land at the time the usufruct was created.118
Subsequently, in 1986, the Legislature revised article 190 to
expand the rights of the surviving spouse usufructuary.119 The
Legislature added a second paragraph to article 190, which
separated surviving spouse usufructs from all other types of
usufructs.120 Currently, surviving spouse usufructs are governed by
article 190(B), and all other usufructs that are not held by surviving
spouses are governed by article 190(A).121 Distinguishing usufructs
in favor of surviving spouses is critically important because the
open mine doctrine does not apply to usufructs in favor of
surviving spouses.122
Article 190(A) is identical to pre-revision article 190, but it
excludes surviving spouses; it affects usufructs of parents during
marriage, other legal usufructs, and all conventional usufructs,
115. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:190 (1975). See Gueno, 117 So. 2d at 822
(citing PLANIOL, in Vol. 1, No. 2794 TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL);
see also Patrick H. Martin & J. Lanier Yeates, Louisiana and Texas Oil & Gas
Law: An Overview of the Differences, 52 LA. L. REV. 769, 820 (1992)
(“Louisiana does have an open mine doctrine that is an exception to the rule that
the naked owner of land enjoys the present benefit of the minerals. The open
mine doctrine is found in Articles 190 and 191 of the Mineral Code.”).
116. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:190 (1975).
117. Id.
118. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:191 (2000).
119. Act No. 245, 1986 La. Acts 540 (“To amend and reenact R.S. 31:190,
relative to the rights of usufructuaries in minerals; to provide that the usufruct of
land of the surviving spouse includes the use and enjoyment of the landowner's
rights in minerals, whether or not mines or quarries were actually worked at the
creation of the usufruct; and to provide for related matters.”). Mineral Code
article 190 was “designed to expand the benefits of a usufructuary.” Patrick H.
Martin, Developments in the Law 1990–1991, Mineral Rights, 52 LA. L. REV.
677, 697 (1992).
120. See Act No. 245, 1986 La. Acts 540.
121. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:190 (2000).
122. See id.
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including testamentary usufructs, that do not have provisions
limiting the use and enjoyment of minerals.123 All usufructs under
article 190(A) are still subject to the open mine doctrine.124
However, surviving spouse usufructs are currently governed by
article 190(B), which states:
If a usufruct of land is that of a surviving spouse, whether
legal or conventional, and there is no contrary provision in
the instrument creating the usufruct, the usufructuary is
entitled to the use and enjoyment of the landowner’s rights
in minerals, whether or not mines or quarries were actually
worked at the time the usufruct was created. However, the
rights to which the usufructuary is thus entitled shall not
include the right to execute a mineral lease without the
consent of the naked owner.125
Thus, under article 190(B), surviving spouse usufructs, both
legal and testamentary, are not subject to the open mine
doctrine.126 Instead, a surviving spouse usufructuary is entitled to
the mineral rights—regardless of when the usufruct was created or
whether the mine was open.127 The Legislature expanded the rights
of the surviving spouse usufruct because it ensures that a surviving
spouse has sufficient support by always receiving the use and
enjoyment of the landowner’s rights in minerals.128 Enjoyment of
the landowner’s rights in minerals means that the surviving spouse
is entitled to mineral royalties irrespective of whether the mine was
open at the time the usufruct was created. Thus, a surviving spouse
usufructuary, whether legal or testamentary, will receive all of the
proceeds that arise out of mineral production in all circumstances,
regardless of when oil operations began or when the usufruct was
created.129
123. Section 31:190(A) states:
If a usufruct of land is that of parents during marriage, or any other legal
usufruct, or if there is no provision including the use and enjoyment of
mineral rights in a conventional usufruct, the usufructuary is entitled to
the use and enjoyment of the landowners rights in minerals as to mines or
quarries actually worked at the time the usufruct was created.
Id. § 31:190(A).
124. Id.
125. Id. § 31:190(B).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, § 2:21, at 155 (“This deviation from
traditional principles is justified in light of the solicitude for the interests of the
surviving spouse.”).
129. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:190(B) (2000).
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II. QUANTUM RESOURCES V. PIRATE LAKE OIL: A FLAWED ANALYSIS
In 2012, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal was faced
with a case that included issues of forced heirship, surviving
spouse usufructs, and Louisiana Mineral Code article 190. The
case was Quantum Resources v. Pirate Lake Oil, and the court had
the task of determining how Louisiana succession law and
Louisiana Mineral Code article 190 worked together.
On May 30, 1989, Elizabeth Jones died testate in Texas.130 At
the time of her death, the only property that Elizabeth owned in
Louisiana was a tract of land (“the tract”) that she inherited from
her father,131 and that land was accordingly classified as her
separate property under Louisiana law.132 In her will, Elizabeth
bequeathed all of her property, including the tract, to her husband,
Allen Jones.133 Although Elizabeth and Allen’s three children were
excluded from her will, at the time of her death, her children were
classified as forced heirs under Louisiana law.134
As forced heirs, the Jones children were entitled to claim the
forced portion of their mother’s estate,135 despite the fact that she
omitted them from her will.136 Several years after their mother’s
death, the children initiated ancillary succession proceedings,137
130. Quantum Res. Mgmt. v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp., 105 So. 3d 867, 869 (La.
Ct. App. 2012). Under Louisiana law, “[t]estate succession results from the will
of the deceased, contained in a testament executed in a form prescribed by law.”
LA. CIV. CODE art. 874 (2015).
131. Original Brief on Behalf of Allen Kent Jones Appellant at 1, Quantum,
105 So. 3d 867 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (No. 12-CA-256).
132. Separate property includes “property acquired by a spouse by
inheritance or donation to him individually.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 2341 (2015).
133. Quantum, 105 So. 3d at 869.
134. Id. Also, Louisiana Civil Code article 870(B) states, “[t]estate and
intestate succession rights, including the right to claim as a forced heir, are
governed by the law in effect on the date of the decedent’s death.” LA. CIV.
CODE art. 870(B) (2015). At the time of Elizabeth Jones’s death, all descendants
of a decedent were considered forced heirs. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1493 (1989).
In 1989, the Louisiana Legislature attempted to revise the forced heirship laws,
but the Supreme Court in Succession of Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1993), held
that revision unconstitutional. Thus, the old forced heirship law should have
governed.
135. Louisiana Civil Code article 1495 states that “[t]he portion reserved for
the forced heirs is called the forced portion and the remainder is called the
disposable portion.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 1495 (2015).
136. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1493 (1989) (“Donations inter vivos or mortis causa
cannot exceed three-fourths of the property of the disposer, if he leaves, at his
decease, one child; and one-half, if he leaves two or more children.”).
137. An ancillary succession proceeding may be opened when a deceased
nonresident leaves property situated in Louisiana. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art.
3401 (2015).

2015]

COMMENT

847

demanding reduction of the disposition made to their father in the
will.138 In 1999, the trial court rendered a judgment of possession
recognizing Allen as having full ownership of the disposable
portion and recognizing the Jones children as naked owners of the
forced portion, subject to a usufruct that terminated at death in
favor of their father.139
In May 1996, prior to the institution of succession proceedings,
Quantum Resources L.L.C. and Milagro Production L.L.C. began
producing oil on the tract.140 Unsure of who was entitled to the
proceeds from the oil production, Quantum and Milagro later filed
a concursus proceeding so that they would not be liable for paying
the proceeds to the incorrect party.141 Both Allen and the Jones
children asserted claims for the royalties: Allen as usufructuary
and the Jones children as naked owners.142 As a result of the
competing claims, the court was called upon to decide which party
was entitled to the mineral royalties under Louisiana Mineral Code
article 190.143
On appeal, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit, in deciding which party
was entitled to the mineral proceeds, first found that the judgment
of possession, a “juridical act,” created the usufruct.144 The court
therefore concluded that the inception of the usufruct was in 1999,
when the judgment of possession was rendered.145 Consequently,
138. Quantum, 105 So. 3d at 869.
139. Id. In Quantum, the judgment of possession was not annulled, amended
or modified. Original Brief on Behalf of Allen Kent Jones Appellant at 2,
Quantum, 105 So. 3d 867 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (No. 12-CA-256). See also LA.
CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3062 (2012) (“The judgment of possession rendered in a
succession proceeding shall be prima facie evidence of the relationship to the
deceased of the parties recognized therein, as heir, legatee, surviving spouse in
community, or usufructuary, as the case may be, and of their right to the
possession of the estate of the deceased.”). A naked owner is one who “enjoys
prerogatives of ownership to the extent that they do not interfere with the
enjoyment of the usufructuary. Accordingly, during the existence of the
usufruct, the rights of the naked owner begin where the rights of the
usufructuary end.” YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, § 5.3, at 341. See also LA.
CIV. CODE art. 603 (2015) (“The naked owner may dispose of the naked
ownership, but he cannot thereby affect the usufruct.”).
140. Original Brief on Behalf of Allen Kent Jones Appellant at 2–3,
Quantum, 105 So. 3d 867 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (No. 12-CA-256).
141. Quantum, 105 So. 3d at 868. A concursus proceeding is “one in which
two or more persons having competing or conflicting claims to money, property,
or mortgages or privileges on property are impleaded and required to assert their
respective claims contradictorily against all other parties to the proceeding.” LA.
CODE CIV. PROC. art. 4651 (2015).
142. See Quantum, 105 So. 3d at 869.
143. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:190 (2000).
144. Quantum, 105 So. 3d at 873.
145. Id. at 873–74.
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the court found that there were open mines at the time the usufruct
was created, because oil production began in 1996, which was
prior to the issuance of the judgment of possession.146 The court
next held that article 190(B) was inapplicable in this case.147
Without stating reasons, the court found that Allen was a legatee of
Elizabeth’s will rather than a surviving spouse, even though Allen
was, in fact, Elizabeth’s surviving spouse. Therefore, the court
held that Mineral Code article 190(B) did not apply.148 Ultimately,
the court applied Mineral Code article 190(A) and awarded the
mineral proceeds to Allen because there were open mines when the
usufruct was created, which meant that Allen as usufructuary was
entitled to the mineral rights.149 Although this outcome ultimately
was correct, the court’s analysis could lead to incorrect results by
subjecting a surviving spouse usufruct to the open mine doctrine.
III. A SCHOLARLY DEBATE: THE PROPER METHOD OF REDUCTION
WHEN A TESTATOR BEQUEATHS ALL OF HIS PROPERTY IN FULL
OWNERSHIP TO HIS SURVIVING SPOUSE
When an heir moves to reduce an excessive disposition in
succession proceedings, an initial step is for the trial court to
render a judgment of possession, which recognizes the relationship
between the parties and sends the heirs and legatees into
possession of the estate.150 The correct method of reduction when a
testator bequeaths all of his separate and community property to
his surviving spouse was not discussed in Quantum because the
court noted that it was not ripe for a decision; however, the
question is of great importance because higher courts give great
deference to judgments of possession until a party to the litigation
questions the judgment in a nullity action.151
A. The Debate
Under current Louisiana law, it is clear that a testator has the
freedom to grant a usufruct in favor of a surviving spouse over his
separate and community property so that the surviving spouse
receives the maximum amount of his estate allowed by law, even
146. Id. at 874.
147. Id. at 873–74.
148. The court stated, “[h]e inherited full ownership of his deceased wife’s
separate property as a legatee of his deceased wife, not as her surviving
spouse.” Id. at 873.
149. Id. at 874. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:190(A) (2000).
150. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3061 (2015).
151. See, e.g., Quantum, 105 So. 3d at 869 n.2.
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when the testator dies and is survived by forced heirs.152 A
question arises, however, as to the proper method of reduction
when a decedent dies testate, bequeathing his separate and
community property in full ownership to his surviving spouse but
leaving forced heirs who are entitled to their forced portion.
Because the forced heirs are entitled to demand reduction, the
surviving spouse’s bequest must be reduced at the request of the
forced heirs in order to satisfy their forced portion.153 Accordingly,
it must be determined whether the surviving spouse is entitled to a
usufruct over the forced portion at all and, if so, the proper
classification of the usufruct. Under prior law, this was determined
by the jurisprudence on the doctrine of confirmation.154 Today, the
answer depends on the proper interpretation of Louisiana Civil
Code article 1503, which details the extent to which dispositions
impinging upon the forced portion must be reduced.155 The change
in the law has sparked debate among legal scholars as to the extent
of reduction that article 1503 requires.156
Under article 1503, “[a] donation . . . that impinges upon the
legitime of a forced heir is not null but is merely reducible to the
extent necessary to eliminate the impingement.”157 However, under
current law, the extent of reduction that is necessary to eliminate
the impingement is a point of debate. There are at least two
competing scholarly views on the method of reduction that should
be employed when a testator leaves all of his property to his
surviving spouse.
The first approach, mentioned in the comments to article 1503,
is based on a textual analysis of the reduction articles, in particular
articles 1499 and 1503.158 Article 1499 states that a usufruct
bequeathed to a surviving spouse “is a permissible burden that
does not impinge on the legitime, whether it affects community or
separate property.”159 Further, article 1503 states, “[a] donation . . .
that impinges upon the legitime of a forced heir is not null but is
merely reducible to the extent necessary to eliminate the
impingement.”160 Thus, article 1503 only requires the minimum

152. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015).
153. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015).
154. See discussion supra Part I.B; Succession of Chauvin, 257 So. 2d 422,
426 (La. 1972).
155. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015).
156. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015) (editor’s notes).
157. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015).
158. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015); LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015).
159. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015).
160. LA. CIV. CODE art.1503 (2015).
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reduction that is sufficient to satisfy each forced heir’s legitime.161
Because a usufruct under article 1499 is a permissible burden and
not an impingement on the legitime, the first scholarly approach
advocates that a legacy in full ownership over all of the testator’s
property in favor of the surviving spouse should be reduced to a
lifetime testamentary usufruct under article 1499 over both
separate and community property with the power to dispose of
nonconsumables.162
Accordingly, the usufruct will not terminate if the usufructuary
remarries, as the legal usufruct does.163 Also, with the power to
dispose of nonconsumables, the usufructuary may lease, alienate, or
encumber immovable property that is included in the testator’s
separate or community property.164 This means that the surviving
spouse can sell, lease, or take out a mortgage on immovable
property, such as the family home. Also, at the option of the
usufructuary, the usufruct of nonconsumables may be transformed
into a usufruct of consumables.165 This is accomplished when the
surviving spouse sells a nonconsumable, such as the family home,
and uses the cash from the sale, which is a consumable, for other
purposes––although the surviving spouse is accountable for the
money at the end of the usufruct.166 Thus, the forced heirs are
entitled to naked ownership of the forced portion, and the
surviving spouse is entitled to a lifetime testamentary usufruct over
the entire forced portion as well as full ownership of the disposable
portion, which is the portion unaffected by the reduction.167
161. See id.
162. “The right to dispose of a nonconsumable thing includes the rights to
lease, alienate, and encumber the thing.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 568 (2015).
However, “[i]t does not include the right to alienate by donation inter vivos,
unless that right is expressly granted.” Id. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499
(2015).
163. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015), with LA. CIV. CODE art. 890
(2015).
164. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 568 (2015).
165. Heirs of Michel v. Knox, 34 La. Ann. 399 (1882). Compare LA. CIV.
CODE art. 538 (2015) (“If the things subject to the usufruct are consumables, the
usufructuary becomes owner of them”), with LA. CIV. CODE art. 539 (2015) (“If
the things subject to the usufruct are nonconsumables, the usufructuary has the
right to possess them and to derive the utility, profits, and advantages that they
may produce, under the obligation of preserving their substance.”).
166. See generally Knox, 34 La. Ann. 399; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 539
(2015) (“He is bound to use them as a prudent administrator and to deliver them
to the naked owner at the termination of the usufruct.”).
167. This approach is supported by comment (b) of article 1503. “[I]f the
husband’s will leaves all to his wife and there is a forced heir who is entitled to
one-fourth, the legacy to the wife is reduced to the disposable portion in full
ownership and a usufruct for life . . . over the forced portion, since that usufruct
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Notably, this method of reduction was used under former
article 890 in Morgan v. Leach.168 In Morgan, the court, in
determining what the testatrix meant by “the entirety of my estate
in full ownership,” looked to her intent.169 The court found that
article 1502, the reduction article under previous law, only
required reduction to the extent necessary to eliminate the
impingement; thus, the surviving spouse received a lifetime
usufruct over community and separate property.170 Also, finding
that it should interpret the will in a way that furthers the testatrix’s
intent, the court found that because the testatrix bequeathed all of
her property in full ownership to her surviving spouse, she
intended to give her surviving spouse the maximum portion of her
estate allowable by law.171 Thus, the first scholarly approach
appears to follow prior law on this issue.
The second scholarly approach, on the other hand, recognizes
the possibility that the surviving spouse should receive a legal
usufruct under article 890 over the forced portion under the
doctrine of confirmation of a legal usufruct by testament.172 This
approach, which is set out in the editor’s notes, mentions Winsberg
v. Winsberg to illustrate that the doctrine of confirmation of a legal
usufruct was relied on under the prior law.173 In Winsberg, the
Court held that an excessive disposition in favor of a surviving
spouse was a confirmation of a legal usufruct and that the usufruct
over the forced portion in favor of the surviving spouse was not an
impingement on the legitime.174 However, in Winsberg, the
surviving spouse only received a usufruct over the forced portion
that consisted of community property, as legal usufructs under
article 890 only attach to community property.175
Under the second approach, the forced heirs would receive full
ownership of separate property included in the forced portion and
could have been left to her expressly under Article 1499.” LA. CIV. CODE art.
1503 cmt. b (2015).
168. Morgan v. Leach, 680 So. 2d 1381, 1384 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
169. Id. at 1383–84.
170. Id. at 1384.
171. Id.
172. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015) (editor’s notes); see also Morgan,
680 So. 2d at 1383.
173. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015) (editor’s notes).
174. Winsberg v. Winsberg, 96 So. 2d 44, 47–48 (La. 1957); A.N.
Yiannopoulos, Testamentary Dispositions in Favor of the Surviving Spouse and
the Legitime of Descendants, 28 LA. L. REV. 509, 520 (1967).
175. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015) (editor’s notes); see also LA. CIV.
CODE art. 890 (2015) (stating that legal usufructs only extend to community
property).
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naked ownership of the testator’s share of community property
included in the forced portion. The surviving spouse would receive
full ownership of the disposable portion and a legal usufruct under
article 890 over the forced portion, which means that the usufruct
would only encompass community property.176 Further, the
surviving spouse would not be entitled to a usufruct over separate
property that forms part of the forced portion, unlike in the textual
approach.177 Also, the usufruct would terminate upon remarriage
instead of lasting for life.178
The debate over the proper method of reduction is of great
importance to the usufructuary and the forced heirs because it
determines what the usufruct encompasses and how long it will
last. Thus, a solution to this debate will greatly help courts in
deciding the qualities of a usufruct when a testator leaves all of his
property to his surviving spouse in full ownership and the forced
heirs exercise their right to reduce.
B. The Solution: Usufruct for Life over Separate and Community
Property with the Power to Dispose of Nonconsumables
Considering that the intent of the testator controls the
interpretation of his testament, the most effective way to solve the
debate over the proper method of reduction is to use the approach
that will conform best to the intent of the testator.179 The method of
reduction that should be used when a testator bequeaths all of his
property to his surviving spouse is to reduce the excessive legacy
to a usufruct under article 1499—a usufruct for life over separate
and community property with the power to dispose of
176. A legal usufruct in favor of a surviving spouse terminates upon
remarriage or death, whichever occurs first. LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (2015).
177. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (2015), with LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499
(2015).
178. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (2015). Professor Yiannopoulos also stated
that there is possibly a third approach to reduction. He stated that “if it were
maintained that the doctrine of confirmation has been suppressed in the 1996
revision, the surviving spouse should merely receive the disposable portion in
full ownership.” See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015) (editor’s notes). However,
as Professor Yiannopoulos observed, “[o]ne may seriously doubt, however, that
the doctrine of confirmation of the legal usufruct by will, established by
Louisiana jurisprudence constante commencing with the Succession of Moore
has been overruled legislatively by a comment which is neither law nor source
of law.” Id. Thus, due to the long line of Louisiana cases that all relied on the
doctrine of confirmation, it is unlikely that the entire doctrine of confirmation is
no longer valid.
179. See Morgan v. Leach, 680 So. 2d 1381, 1384 (La. Ct. App. 1996);
Succession of Waldron, 323 So. 2d 434, 438 (La. 1975).
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nonconsumables.180 The Louisiana Civil Code requires that a
testament be interpreted in a way that furthers, rather than
frustrates, the testator’s intent.181 Accordingly, it is only proper to
give the surviving spouse as close as possible to what the testator
intended.182 When a testator leaves all of his property to his spouse
in full ownership, he obviously intended to give his spouse the
most that he was allowed to bequeath by law. However, if forced
heirs are entitled to a portion of his estate, he is unable to give his
surviving spouse everything that he owns in full ownership.183
Under article 1499, the maximum amount of property that a
testator can bequeath to his surviving spouse is full ownership of
the disposable portion and a usufruct over community and separate
property that terminates upon the death of the usufructuary.184
Given the importance of upholding the testator’s intent in
Louisiana succession law, a usufruct under article 1499 leads to a
better result than a legal usufruct under article 890 that only
encompasses community property. First, a usufruct for life is more
beneficial to the surviving spouse because the usufruct will not
terminate unless the surviving spouse dies,185 whereas a legal
usufruct terminates if and when the surviving spouse remarries.186
This interpretation ensures that, even if the surviving spouse
remarries, she will have enough support to take care of herself and
the surviving children. Notably, the court in Morgan held that a
usufruct, which arose from a bequest of all of the testator’s
property in full ownership, was for life, especially when it was clear
that the testator intended to give the spouse the maximum permitted
under law.187
Second, a testamentary usufruct under article 1499 encompasses
separate and community property,188 whereas a legal usufruct under
article 890 only attaches to community property.189 Granting the
surviving spouse a usufruct that encompasses separate and
180. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015).
181. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1611 (2015).
182. See id.; Succession of Mydland, 653 So. 2d 8, 11–12 (La. Ct. App.
1995).
183. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1494 (2015).
184. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015); LA. CIV. CODE art. 1503 (2015).
185. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015) (stating that a usufruct under this
article is for life, unless there is a contrary provision in the testament).
186. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (2015) (stating that the usufruct ends upon
remarriage).
187. Morgan v. Leach, 680 So. 2d 1381, 1385 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
188. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015) (stating that the testator may grant a
usufruct over separate and community property).
189. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (2015) (stating that a legal usufruct will be
only over community property).
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community property allows the surviving spouse to have the use
and enjoyment of all the testator’s property, regardless of the type
of property. Allowing the usufruct to encompass a larger portion of
the testator’s property, rather than limiting the usufruct to
community property, ensures a greater likelihood that the surviving
spouse has sufficient support and that the usufruct better conforms
to the testator’s intent.190
The surviving spouse will also have the power to dispose of
nonconsumables under an article 1499 usufruct.191 This means that
the usufructuary has the power to lease, alienate, and encumber
immovable things, such as the family home, without the consent of
the forced heirs.192 A legal usufruct under article 890 does not have
the right to dispose of nonconsumables because the usufruct is
created by operation of law, and this right may only be granted by
express disposition.193 However, under article 1499, a testator may
grant the power to dispose of nonconsumables; thus, since the law
allows the testator to grant the surviving spouse this right, the
usufructuary is entitled to dispose of nonconsumables so that she
may receive the maximum amount of property that the law
allows.194
A usufruct under article 1499 also conforms to the policy
changes driving the 1996 revision because Louisiana is moving
away from favoring forced heirs and currently allows a testator
more freedom to bequeath his property to whomever he wants.
When a testator bequeaths all of his property to his surviving
spouse, the testator most likely intended to give his surviving
spouse as much as the law allows, and a usufruct under article
1499 grants the most support to the surviving spouse.195 It also
furthers another purpose of the 1996 revision, which was “to
present the rules in a coherent framework that should be practical
and workable.”196 This method of reduction is more practical and
workable than the approach that employs the doctrine of
confirmation because it is based on a simple textual analysis of
articles 1499 and 1503, which are easily applied to an excessive
donation. The method of reduction that grants a legal usufruct
under article 890 is based on the jurisprudential doctrine of
190. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015).
191. See id.
192. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 568 (2015); see also Heirs of Michel v. Knox, 34
La. Ann. 399 (1882).
193. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 568 (2015).
194. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015).
195. See LORIO, supra note 34, § 10.1, at 1177–78.
196. Act No. 77, 1996 La. Acts 1016 (introductory note).
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confirmation, the validity of which has been questioned.197 Thus,
in deciding judgments of possession when an excessive legacy is
left in full ownership in favor of a surviving spouse and a forced
heir moves to reduce the excessive disposition, courts should
reduce the legacy to a usufruct under article 1499––a usufruct for
life over separate and community property with the power to
dispose of nonconsumables.198
C. Application to Quantum
In Quantum, the court was not faced with the question of the
method of reduction when a testator leaves his entire estate in full
ownership to the surviving spouse; however, a few years after their
mother’s death, the Jones children moved to reduce the excessive
legacy in favor of their father in order to satisfy their forced
portion.199 The 24th Judicial District Court issued a judgment of
possession recognizing Allen as the universal legatee of his wife and
the Jones children as forced heirs who were entitled to reduce their
father’s legacy.200 Ultimately, the trial court found that Allen was
entitled to full ownership of the disposable portion of Elizabeth’s
estate and to a lifetime usufruct over the forced portion, which
consisted entirely of separate property.201 Subsequently, the forced
heirs filed a petition for annulment,202 which attacked the judgment
of possession alleging that, inter alia, a lifetime usufruct over the
entire estate impinged on their individual legitimes.203 The trial
court had not ruled on the annulment matter at the time the
Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal decided Quantum. The
Fifth Circuit found that the judgment of possession was valid and
final and did not issue an opinion on the annulment matter.204
197. See discussion supra Part III.A.
198. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1499 (2015).
199. Quantum Res. Mgmt. v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp., 105 So. 3d 867, 873 (La.
Ct. App. 2012).
200. Id. at 869.
201. Id. at 869–70.
202. Article 2004 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure states that “a
final judgment obtained by fraud or ill practices may be annulled.” LA. CODE
CIV. PROC. art. 2004 (2015).
203. Quantum, 105 So. 3d at 869.
204. The Quantum court addressed the annulment matter in a footnote,
stating:
In September of 2010, Jennifer Jones and her brother, Patrick Jones,
filed a separate proceeding in the 24th Judicial District Court entitled
“Petition for Annulment of Judgment Obtained by Fraud and Ill
Practices,” Docket No. 692–379 (they were not joined by their sister
Jacqueline, who appears in other pleadings in this record aligned with
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The Quantum court missed an opportunity to discuss the proper
method of reduction when there is an excessive legacy in full
ownership of the entire estate in favor of the surviving spouse.
Luckily for the parties involved, the 24th Judicial District Court
used the method of reduction that conforms best to the intent of the
testator by recognizing Allen as the full owner of the disposable
portion with a lifetime usufruct over the entire forced portion,
which included solely separate property.205 Thus, when reducing
excessive legacies, trial courts must use the method of reduction
that is most faithful to the testator’s intent, which, as the trial court
properly held in this case, is full ownership of the disposable
portion and a lifetime usufruct over the entire estate in favor of the
surviving spouse.206
IV. QUANTUM AND MINERAL CODE ARTICLE 190: THE IMPORTANCE
OF PROPERLY CLASSIFYING A USUFRUCT
The Quantum court was next faced with classifying the
usufruct and applying that classification to Mineral Code article
190. According to the Louisiana Mineral Code, a usufruct of land
does not typically include the landowner’s rights in minerals.207
However, Mineral Code article 190 specifies two exceptions to the
general rule that apply to usufructs.208 Usufructs in favor of
surviving spouses, whether classified as legal or conventional, are
entitled to the mineral rights regardless of whether there were open
mines at the time the usufruct was created.209 All usufructs that are
Mr. Jones). Therein, they attack the Judgment of Possession rendered in
the ancillary succession proceeding, contending that they had no
knowledge of the ancillary succession proceeding, despite the fact that
the matter was filed on their behalf, denying the validity of their
signatures on those pleadings. They also argued that it was a conflict of
interest for the same counsel to represent them and their father, one that
they did not waive. Another part of the petition asserted that awarding
them naked ownership subject to Mr. Jones’ usufruct rather than full
ownership of the forced portion impinged upon their legitime. As of the
date of the issuance of this opinion, there has been no judgment in the
annulment matter. Thus, the Judgment of Possession rendered in the
Ancillary Succession remains valid and final at this time. We express
no opinion in the annulment matter or how a nullity judgment in that
suit might affect the instant matter.
Quantum, 105 So. 3d at 869 n.2.
205. Id. at 873.
206. Id. at 869–70.
207. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:188 (2000).
208. Id. § 31:190.
209. Id. § 31:190(B).
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held by persons other than surviving spouses are subject to the
open mine doctrine and are not entitled to the mineral rights if
drilling operations began prior to the creation of the usufruct.210
Thus, in order to correctly apply Mineral Code article 190, it is
important to determine the usufruct’s classification and if the
usufruct is in favor of a surviving spouse.211
A. Classifying a Usufruct That Is Reduced from Full Ownership
Under Current Law
When a testator bequeaths more of his property than the law
allows to someone other than the forced heirs, and the forced heirs
later reduce the excessive disposition, the usufruct must be
classified as legal or conventional to determine the qualities of the
usufruct. One may think, as the Louisiana Fifth Circuit in Quantum
thought, that an excessive disposition in full ownership creates a
conventional usufruct that is created by a juridical act––the
judgment of possession.212 The Fifth Circuit argued that the forced
heir’s right to reduce is optional; thus, if the forced heirs did not
exercise their right to reduce, the universal legatee would retain
full ownership over all of the community and separate property.213
Under this view, the judgment of possession created the usufruct
because if the trial court had not made a judicial determination of
reduction there would be no usufruct.214 The usufruct would
therefore be classified as conventional because it was created by a
juridical act––although the result is correct, the reasoning is
seriously flawed.215
It is well settled that judgments of possession do not create
rights;216 legatees and heirs’ rights arise from a testator’s will or by
operation of law, not a judgment of possession.217 A judgment of
possession simply recognizes the rights to which legatees and heirs
are entitled and sends the parties into possession of the property.218
210. Id. § 31:190(A).
211. See discussion supra Part I.C.
212. Quantum Res. Mgmt.v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp., 105 So. 3d 867, 873 (La.
Ct. App. 2012).
213. Id.
214. See id.
215. LA. CIV. CODE art. 544 (2015).
216. “In a judgment of possession, an heir ‘acquires nothing . . . that was not
already his by operation of law.’” Scalise, Jr., supra note 13, at 434 (citations
omitted).
217. See Dalton v. Wickliffe, 35 La. Ann. 355, 359 (1883) (“We are bound to
find his rights, if they exist, in the will and not in an ex parte order of a court.”).
218. See Succession of Prutzman, 209 So. 2d 303, 306 (La. Ct. App. 1968)
(citing former Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3062).
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Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3061 explicitly states
that a judgment of possession “shall recognize” the relationship
between the petitioner and the deceased.219 Further, Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure article 3062 provides that a judgment of
possession is prima facie evidence of the relationship of the parties
to the deceased recognized in the judgment.220 Articles 3061 and
3062 illustrate the well-settled fact that a judgment of possession
merely recognizes rights––it does not create rights.221
A forced heir’s optional right of reduction does not have any
legal impact on the fact that a judgment of possession does not
confer rights. Although it is true that an heir or legatee would not
have a usufruct if the forced heirs did not exercise their right of
reduction, the judgment of possession still does not create any
rights.222 Accordingly, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit’s view in
Quantum that the judgment of possession created the usufruct is
faulty because it is impossible for a judgment of possession to
create rights.223
Under current law, the proper classification for such a usufruct–
–one recognized by a judgment of possession from an excessive
disposition in full ownership––is a conventional usufruct. This type
of usufruct is created by a decedent’s testament––a juridical act––
and can be classified as conventional or “testamentary.”224 The
usufruct arises out of the testator’s will because the testator’s
bequest in full ownership is reduced to an amount that is sufficient
to satisfy the forced portion.225 The bequest in full ownership
includes the usus, fructus, and abusus.226 After reduction, the forced
heirs become the naked owners, which includes the right of abusus,
and the usufructuary is left with the usus and fructus.227 Thus, the
usufruct is the remnant of the testator’s bequest in full ownership
after the forced heirs exercise their right of reduction and the
legitime is satisfied.
It is essential not only to classify the usufruct, but also to
correctly identify the source of the usufruct in order to determine
when the usufruct arises. One may also think, as did the Quantum
219. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3061 (2015).
220. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3062 (2015); Taylor v. Williams, 110 So.
100, 101 (La. 1926).
221. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 3061–3062 (2015).
222. See id.
223. See Scalise, Jr., supra note 13, at 434.
224. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 874 (2015).
225. See Dalton v. Wickliffe, 35 La. Ann. 355, 359 (1883); LA. CIV. CODE
art. 1503 (2015).
226. See supra note 50.
227. See supra note 56.
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court, that the judgment of possession created the usufruct, and
thus the usufruct arose when the judgment of possession was
rendered.228 However, this ignores the fact that the “[s]uccession
occurs at the death of a person,”229 and Louisiana’s concept of
seizin, which invests heirs with the ability to exercise possession
over the estate at the death of the decedent.230 After identifying the
correct source of the usufruct—the testator’s will rather than the
judgment of possession—there is but one logical point in time at
which the usufruct could arise––at the death of the decedent.231
Because the successor is vested with the decedent’s entire estate at
death by the bequest in full ownership, the fact that the judgment of
possession later recognized that the forced heirs, as naked owners,
were entitled to the abusus does not cause the usufruct to arise when
the judgment of possession was granted. Further, holding that the
usufruct is created when the judgment of possession is rendered also
creates uncertainty and confusion because judgments of possession
can be changed or annulled,232 whereas the date of the death of the
decedent can never be changed.
Next, it must be determined whether the usufruct is in favor of a
surviving spouse. If the usufruct is in favor of a surviving spouse,
then the usufruct will not be subject to the open mine doctrine, and
the usufructuary will receive the mineral rights regardless of when
the usufruct was created.233 One may argue, as the Louisiana Fifth
Circuit argued in Quantum, that even though the usufructuary was
the decedent’s surviving spouse, the spouse was not a surviving
spouse within the meaning of the Mineral Code because the spouse
inherited the decedent’s property as the legatee of the will––not as
the surviving spouse.234 Ultimately, this leads to the conclusion
that the usufruct is conventional and is not in favor of a surviving
spouse; thus, Mineral Code article 190(A) must be applied instead
of article 190(B).
This view is also flawed because if a spouse is, in fact, the
surviving spouse, then the spouse should also be a surviving
spouse under the Mineral Code. Mineral Code article 190 was
separated into two articles in order to provide that all successors
who were surviving spouses would not be subject to the open mine
228. Quantum Res. Mgmt. v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp., 105 So. 3d 867, 873 (La.
Ct. App. 2012).
229. LA. CIV. CODE art. 934 (2015).
230. LA. CIV. CODE art. 935 (2015).
231. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 934 (2015).
232. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2004 (2015).
233. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:190 (2000).
234. Quantum Res. Mgmt. v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp., 105 So. 3d 867, 873 (La.
Ct. App. 2012).
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doctrine.235 Therefore, if a spouse who is, in fact, a surviving spouse
is not considered a surviving spouse under the Mineral Code, then
the revision and article 190(B) would be simply surplusage and
would be rendered meaningless.236 There is also no support in the
Mineral Code for the court’s proposition that a true surviving spouse
should be treated as a legatee of the decedent’s will.237
Accordingly, a true surviving spouse should be correctly
classified as a surviving spouse for purposes of the Mineral Code;
thus, because the usufruct is that of a surviving spouse, Mineral
Code article 190(B) should apply. Under article 190(B), the
usufruct is not subject to the open mine doctrine, which means that
the surviving spouse receives the mineral rights regardless of when
the usufruct was created or when drilling operations began.238 This
result also best conforms to the testator’s intent because the
surviving spouse will receive the mineral rights, which will
provide more support for the surviving spouse. It is also consistent
with the intent behind the creation of Mineral Code article 190(B)
because it expands the rights of the usufructuary.239
Even though the usufructuary is entitled to the mineral rights,
the forced heirs are not without hope. Generally, under Mineral
Code article 192, a usufructuary has the right to grant mineral
leases as long as the land is not burdened with an ongoing lease.240
However, under article 190(B), a surviving spouse usufruct does
not include the right to execute a mineral lease without the consent
of the naked owners.241 Thus, the forced heirs have the power to
grant mineral leases on the property, which entitles them to retain
bonuses and rental payments.242
235. See Martin & Yeates, supra note 115, at 820.
236. See Black v. St. Tammany Parish Hosp., 25 So. 3d 711, 718 (La. 2009).
237. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, § 2:21, at 155 n.4.
238. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:190(B) (2000).
239. See Martin & Yeates, supra note 115, at 820 (“When originally enacted
they provided very strictly that the usufructuary of land could enjoy the minerals
only on mines actually worked at the time the usufruct came into existence. This
meant that the pool actually had to be penetrated and shown by surface test to be
capable of production in paying quantities. In 1986 the legislature modified the
operation of the open mine doctrine to provide that the usufruct of the surviving
spouse will enjoy the rights to minerals whether or not there is an actual working
of a mine at the time the usufruct comes into existence.”).
240. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:192 (2000).
241. Id. § 31:190(B).
242. See id. § 31:105 (explaining that the nature of an executive right
includes the right to grant leases). A bonus is “money or other property given for
the execution of a mineral lease.” Id. § 31:213(1). Rental means “money or other
property given to maintain a mineral lease in the absence of drilling or mining
operations or production of minerals.” Id. § 31:213(4).
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B. Application to Quantum: Old Law Controls
The Quantum court’s first mistake was in applying current
succession law when classifying Allen’s usufruct, even though the
decedent died in 1989––before the new law took effect.243
According to Louisiana Civil Code article 870(B), the law in effect
on the date of the decedent’s death governs succession rights.244
This incorrect application is evidenced by the court’s citation to
current article 890 instead of former article 890.245 Thus, the court
should have looked to the law applicable in 1989 to properly
analyze the case.
The Quantum court should have applied the applicable law at
the time of the decedent’s death, just as the court did in Morgan v.
Leach.246 In Morgan, the decedent died in 1994 and bequeathed
her entire estate in full ownership to her husband.247 Her children,
who met the qualifications to be forced heirs, exercised their right to
reduce the excessive disposition.248 The court in Morgan held that
all usufructs established under former article 890 were “treated” as
legal usufructs, and “unless there is an adverse testamentary
disposition, the surviving spouse inherits, by operation of law, a
usufruct of the estate to the extent permitted by Article 890.”249 The
court noted that a bequest to a spouse of more than the law allows is
not an adverse disposition and treated the excessive disposition as a
confirmation of a legal usufruct.250 Ultimately, the Morgan court
held that the surviving spouse was entitled to a legal usufruct under
former article 890.251
Just as in Morgan, the testatrix in Quantum died before the
1996 revision;252 thus, the same law that the court used in Morgan
should have been applied in Quantum. The testatrix in Quantum
also bequeathed an excessive disposition to her husband in full
243. Quantum Res. Mgmt. v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp., 105 So. 3d 867, 869 (La.
Ct. App. 2012).
244. LA. CIV. CODE art. 870 (2015).
245. Quantum, 105 So. 3d at 873.
246. Morgan v. Leach, 680 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
247. Id. at 1382.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1383 (citing Succession of Waldron, 323 So. 2d 434, 437 (La.
1975)).
250. See Succession of Waldron, 323 So. 2d 434, 437 (La. 1975); Winsberg
v. Winsberg, 96 So. 2d 44, 48 (La. 1957); Morgan, 680 So. 2d at 1383.
251. Former article 890 encompassed legal and testamentary surviving
spouse usufruct. See Morgan, 680 So. 2d at 1383.
252. Quantum Res. Mgmt. v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp., 105 So. 3d 867, 869 (La.
Ct. App. 2012).
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ownership, but she also had forced heirs.253 As in Morgan, the
Quantum court should have applied former article 890. Under this
reasoning, the excessive disposition in favor of Allen would not
constitute an adverse testamentary disposition to an article 890
usufruct.254 Thus, the proper classification for Allen’s usufruct
under prior law was a legal surviving spouse usufruct.255
In applying the incorrect law to the facts of Quantum, the court
also misapplied Mineral Code article 190. The court held that
Mineral Code article 190(B) did not apply to the case because,
based on its classification of Allen’s usufruct, he was not a
surviving spouse under article 190.256 It instead found that article
190(A) was applicable to this case because the usufruct was
classified as conventional.257 Thus, the Quantum court held that
Allen was entitled to the use and enjoyment of the mineral rights
because there was an open mine at the time the usufruct was
created––mineral production began in 1996, and the usufruct was
created in 1999.258
However, under prior law, Allen should have received a
usufruct that was “treated” as a legal surviving spouse usufruct
even though it resulted from the testatrix’s will.259 Although the
judgment of possession did not specifically state that the usufruct
was that of a surviving spouse, the court should have applied
article 190(B) because the usufruct was that of a surviving
spouse.260 Under article 190(B), Allen, as a surviving spouse under
the Mineral Code, should have been entitled to the use and
enjoyment of the mineral rights regardless of the existence of open
mines or the date of inception of the usufruct. This means that the
dates the usufruct and drilling operations commenced were
actually irrelevant. Thus, even though the court ultimately held that
Allen was entitled to the mineral rights because the usufruct was
created before there were open mines, the court applied the current
law to reach that result, when it should have applied the prerevision law.
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See Morgan, 680 So. 2d at 1383.
See id.
Quantum, 105 So. 3d at 874.
Id.
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See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:190(B) (2000).

2015]

COMMENT

863

CONCLUSION
The court’s analysis in Quantum Resources v. Pirate Lake Oil
illustrates the importance of properly classifying a usufruct,
specifically a usufruct that arises from a bequest in full ownership
in favor of the surviving spouse that is reduced by the forced heirs.
A case with facts similar to Quantum will come before Louisiana
courts again, and large sums of money will be on the line. With the
ongoing policy changes in Louisiana and the increasing demand
for free testation, Louisiana courts must interpret wills in a way
that furthers the testator’s intent. Allen Jones was lucky that
drilling operations began before the judgment of possession,
because, if not, he would have been deprived of money that was
rightfully his. Future surviving spouses might not be so fortunate
and might be deprived of their property if the Quantum analysis is
followed. Instead, when there is a surviving spouse, courts must
apply Mineral Code article 190(B), meaning that the surviving
spouse will receive the mineral rights regardless of the open mine
doctrine.
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